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Abstract
In an electronic voting protocol, a distributed scheme can be used for forbid-
ding the malicious acts of the voting administrator and the counter during
the election, but it cannot prevent them from collaborating to trace the bal-
lots and destroy their privacy after the election. We present a distributed
anonymous quantum key distribution scheme and further construct a dis-
tributed quantum election scheme with a voting administrator made up of
more than one part. This quantum election scheme can resist the malicious
acts of the voting administrator and the counter after the election and can
work in a system with lossy and noisy quantum channels.
Keywords: quantum election, distributed scheme, conjugate coding
1. Introduction
In a large-scale election, the problem that most concerns the voters is the
privacy of the election. That is, an eligible voter does not want anybody
to track his/her ballot at any time. Further, eligibility and unreusability
are other serious problems. That is, only eligible voters are permitted to
vote, and each eligible voter can vote successfully only once. In view of the
properties described in earlier papers[1−3], an ideal election scheme should
have the following properties: completeness, soundness, privacy, eligibility,
unreusability, fairness and verifiability. In order to ensure these properties,
considerable attention has been paid to election schemes. These schemes
can be divided to two parts: electronic election and quantum election. The
homomorphic-encryption-based scheme[4−7], mix-net-based scheme[1,8], and
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blind signature-based scheme[2,3,9,10] are there main types of electronic voting
schemes. These schemes can efficiently solve the drawback of achieving pri-
vacy and fairness at the same time. However, the security of these schemes
is based on the difficulty of solving certain mathematical problems; it will be
threatened by the use of a quantum computer. When a quantum computer is
used, mathematical security can no longer prevent the attacker from knowing
whom a voter voted for in the election.
Quantum cryptography can be used for solving the problem of uncondi-
tional security and privacy that mentioned in the earlier electronic voting
schemes, which use the fundamental laws of quantum physics to ensure un-
conditional security[11−15]. For example, we can use the quantum non-cloning
theorem for unconditionally secure quantum key distribution[16−19], and we
can use quantum anonymous transmission[20] to conceal the identity of the
sender of the messages. Considerable attention has been paid to quantum
election protocols. Vaccaro et al. propose a quantum election protocol[21]
by adding different local quantum operations to an entangled quantum state
that distributed over separated sites in 2007, the physical inaccessibility of
any one site is sufficient to guarantee the anonymity of the votes; Hillery et
al. presents a similar protocol[22], in which the initial state of the system
is denoted by a quantum state |Ω0〉, and the eligible voter Vj expresses his
choice through different operations U jk to the initial quantum state(the value
of k depends on his choice). The counter extracts the outcome of the election
through a complicated measurement of the final quantum state and cannot
traces the ballot of a specific voter. These protocols are relatively significant
progress in the field of quantum elections. On the one hand, these protocols
efficiently guarantee the security of the election and ensure the anonymity of
the voters; however, on the other hand, as the outcome of the measurement
is the number statistics of all the votes, no voter can trace his ballot from the
outcome, and thus, he cannot ensure whether he has voted successfully or
not. Further, the reading of the outcome statistics is a complicated measure-
ment: there is no reliable way of knowing whether a voter has voted more
than once, and the voting for the candidates of the election is restricted to
yes or no. The protocol in [23] presents a quantum election scheme without
complicated measurements: this scheme uses a Fourier transform for exe-
cuting voting and can be implemented as soon as the implementation of the
discrete Fourier transform becomes possible. [24] proposes a new protocol for
quantum anonymous voting, which protects both the voters from a curious
tallyman and all the participants from a dishonest voter in an unconditional
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way. The voting for the candidates of the ballots is still restricted to yes
or no. [25] presents a traveling ballot scheme based on quantum mechanics,
the main idea of this scheme is that the voters cast their votes in an orderly
manner with a traveling quantum state. In this scheme, the voters can vote
for many candidates, and they can determine whether to cast their ballots to
the traveling state. As there is still no reliable way to avoid the voters from
voting more than once, a malicious voter may try to detect the execution
of the election. All the protocols mentioned above are based on entangled
quantum states.
Unlike these protocols, in paper [26], Okamoto et al. present a relatively
expedient quantum voting scheme based on conjugate coding, in which a
ballot is an unknown quantum state that enables a voter to exercise his right
to vote. This scheme ensures the unconditional security and anonymity of
the election without the use of entangled quantum states, and the quantum
blank votes generated in advance avoid a voter from voting more than once.
As the quantum ballot is randomized by the voter before sending it to the
voting administrator, nobody can trace the voter’s ballot. This efficiently
protects the private of the voter, but at the same time makes it impossible
for the voter to check whether he has voted successfully or not; that is, ver-
ifiability is not guaranteed. On the basis of this protocol, in paper [27], we
present a new quantum election scheme, which depends on the security of the
anonymous quantum key distribution to ensure unconditional security. This
scheme ensures the completeness, soundness, privacy, eligibility, unreusabil-
ity, fairness and verifiability of an election while the voting administrator and
the counter are semi-honest; it can efficiently avoid a voter from voting more
than once and works even when there exist losses and errors in the quantum
channels. However, in this scheme, the security of the election depends con-
siderably on the credibility of the voting administrator and the counter, as
the administrator may try to forge valid votes by impersonating the voters
and there is no reliable way to solve the dispute between the administrator
and the voters. Further, the security will be threatened by a collusion of the
administrator and the counter.
A distributed scheme can be used for solving a dispute between the voting
administrator and the voters. The distributed scheme is a scheme in which
several independent parties, e.g., several candidates of the election, collabo-
rate to act as the voting administrator. A combination of a traditional one-
time pad and a distributed scheme can efficiently ensure information security
and avoid the voting administrator from impersonating a voter. However,
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the security of the protocol is difficult to achieve in real life because there
is no effective way to guarantee that the parties that form the voting ad-
ministrator will not cooperate to trace the ballots forever. Whenever they
cooperate, the privacy of the election is at risk even when there are a suf-
ficient number of key strings. In this paper, we propose a new distributed
quantum election scheme, in which we use a combination of a distributed
scheme and quantum cryptography to construct an unconditionally secure
distributed anonymous quantum key distributed scheme and to remove the
threat posed by the voting administrator and the counter. The security of the
anonymous quantum key distribution is based on the security of the quan-
tum key distribution. With the help of the voting administrator, the voter
can anonymously establish a key string with the counter; this key is invisible
to the administrator. In the new distributed scheme, when the election is
completed, nobody can trace the ballot to detect the privacy of the election
even if the voting administrator and the counter collaborate to do so; this to
an extent improves the security level of the scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present
our former quantum election scheme based on anonymous quantum key dis-
tribution, and then we discuss a traditional election scheme that uses the
distributed scheme and analysis its security. In Section 3, we present dis-
tributed anonymous quantum key distribution schemes that will be used in
the distributed quantum election scheme proposed in the next section. We
present the proposed distributed quantum election scheme in Section 4, and
in Section 5, we discuss the advantages of the proposed quantum election
scheme. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 6.
2. Preliminary
We use the notation ‖ to denote the concatenation of strings. Ek[M ]
denotes an unconditionally secure symmetric encryption algorithm, and f(·)
denotes an information-secure one-way function:
F (ai, bi) = ai ⊕ bi, (1)
where ai and bi are bit strings having the same length.
In view of the properties described in [1− 3], a secure quantum election
scheme should satisfy following: It is complete, if one ballot is valid, it should
be countable. It should be sound so that a dishonest voter cannot disturb
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the election. It is anonymous, the owner of a ballot is invisible to others. It
should be non-repeatable, and hence, no voter can vote successfully twice.
It should be fair so that the earlier voters cannot affect the later voters. It
should be verifiable, a voter should be able to check his ballot at the end of
the election. We use IDi to represent the identity of the eligible voter Vi.
As introduced in [28], a scheme with covert security can guarantee that
once an adversary attempts to cheat in order to destroy some security prop-
erties of the scheme, the honest parties will notice the cheating attempt with
some constant probability. In other words, any irregularity in the scheme
should be detected with some constant probability. We believe that a dis-
tributed quantum election scheme in a sense should ensure covert security.
2.1. Quantum election based on anonymous quantum key distribution
We presented an election scheme based on an anonymous quantum key
distribution scheme using a semi-honest model in [27], this scheme can effi-
ciently satisfy all the properties mentioned above. Four phases are included
in the scheme: initial phase, authentication phase, key distribution phase
and voting phase. Several voters Vj, j=1,2,· · · ,N, the voting administrator
Bob, and the counter Charlie are also involved.
Initial phase: In the initial phase, the voting administrator Bob pub-
lishes a set S ⊂ {0, 1}s. Each element of the set is randomly chosen by Bob
to represent an eligible candidate. In the election scheme, an eligible voter
Vj chooses an element as his ballot vj.
The voting administrator Bob establishes a key kbj with every eligible
voter Vj, j=1,2,· · · ,N, by directly contacting or using an unconditionally se-
cure quantum key distribution protocol. All the four parts of kbj are selected
uniquely for Vj.
All these tasks should be completed in advance.
Authentication phase: When the eligible voter Vj wants to vote, he
sends a request by sending the group (IDj, kj) to Bob. Then Bob checks
whether Vj has successfully applied for voting before. If not, Bob verifies
whether the string kj is correct: if it is correct, Bob accepts Vj’s request.
At the end of the authentication phase, Bob announces the number of
verified voters(we denote it by n) and publishes a set that contains all the
verified IDj, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Now the scheme turns to the key distribution
phase.
Key distribution phase: In this phase, Bob helps each verified voter
Vj to execute an anonymous quantum key distribution protocol to establish
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a key Kic between Vj and Charlie. Here Kic = KicL‖KicR. The anonymous
quantum key distribution scheme is unconditional secure under semi-honest
model, and Vj can verifies whether the anonymous quantum key distribution
process is successful.
Voting phase: While Vj ensures that the anonymous quantum key dis-
tribution is successful, he has anonymously established a 2s-bit key Kic with
Charlie successfully. Then, he chooses an element from set S as his ballot
vj and uses KicR to encrypt his ballot. Next, he anonymously sends the
encrypted ballot along with KicL to Charlie.
Charlie checks whether KicL is correct and whether he has accepted it
before. If it is correct and he has not accepted it before, he extracts the cor-
responding KicR and uses it to decrypt the encrypted ballot. If the outcome
vj ∈ S, Charlie counts vj and accepts KicL.
While all the verified voters vote successfully, Charlie counts the number
of each candidate’s ballots. Subsequently, he randomly arranges all the ac-
cepted groups (KicL, vj) and publicly publishes them for the voters to trace
their ballots. The scheme is now completed.
The quantum election scheme satisfies all the properties mentioned above
efficiently, and any irregularity in the scheme is sensible while the adminis-
trator and the counter are semi-honest. When an attacker attempts to im-
personate a voter to vote, he will be detected by the voter. However, in an
election scheme, the administrator and the counter may also try to adversely
affect the election: If Bob is malicious, he can easily impersonate eligible
voters and help a candidate to forge ballots; at the same time, a malicious
counter may also tamper the ballot of an eligible voter. Although eligible
voters can discover these irregularities, there is no reliable way to prove their
discovery. In order to solve this problem, we propose a new quantum election
scheme, which combines the distributed scheme with quantum cryptography
to improve the security level of the quantum election. In the distributed
scheme, the voting administrator is made up of several independent parties
who will not collaborate to adversely affect the election during the scheme.
While the scheme is completed, the security and privacy of the voters will
not be threatened by the voting administrator and the counter, even if the
two parties collaborate.
2.2. Traditional distributed election scheme
Durette et al. use a combination of public key cryptography and multiple
administrators to improve the security of the overall voting system by avoid-
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ing a single administrator from forging valid votes in [29]; [30] presented a
scheme in which the work for a voter is linear in the number of authorities
but can be instantiated to yield information-theoretic privacy. When there
are n authorities, m voters, the security parameter is k, the total amount
of communication will be O(kmn) bits, and the required effort for any au-
thority and any voter will be O(km) and O(kn) operations, respectively. In
this scheme for any threshold t 6 n, privacy will be assured against coali-
tions that include at most t−1 authorities, and robustness against coalitions
that includes at most n− t authorities. An information security traditional
distributed election scheme can be described as follows:
As mentioned in the previous paper, there are three parties involved in the
scheme: the voters, the voting administrator Bob, and the counter Charlie.
In particular, the voting administrator Bob is made up of multiple indepen-
dent entities. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that it is made up of
two independent entities Bob1 and Bob2, who will not cooperate to cheat.
Before the voting, the voting administrator publishes a set Y ⊂ {0, 1}y. Each
element of the set is a y-bit string that randomly chosen by Bob to represent
an eligible candidate.
The voting administrator establishes a secret number ri to each eligible
voter in advance. The secret number is visible to both Bob1 and Bob2.
2.2.1. Initial phase
(1) Vi applies for voting by sending his/her identity IDi along with the
secret number ri to Bob.
(2) After getting Vi’s request, Bob checks whether Vi has applied for voting
before. If he has, Bob rejects his request; otherwise, Bob checks whether ri
is correct. If it is correct, the scheme moves to the next step.
(3) Bob1 and Bob2 respectively establish a secret string with Vi by directly
contacting or using an unconditionally secure quantum key distribution pro-
tocol. We denote these strings by
Si1 = Ni1‖Ti1, (2)
Si2 = Ni2‖Ti2, (3)
and Vi uses the function f(·) to generate
Ni = f(Ni1, Ni2), (4)
Ti = f(Ti1, Ti2). (5)
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(4) Bob1 and Bob2 respectively establish the secret strings Si1 and Si2
with Charlie in the same manner as that used in the previous step, and
Charlie also uses function f(·) to get the strings Ni and Ti.
2.2.2. Voting and counting phase
(1) Vi chooses one candidate as his vote vi and encrypts it by Ni. Then,
he sends ENi [vi] to Charlie along with Ti.
(2) When he receives (Ti, ENi [vi]), Charlie checks whether he has received
Ti before. If not, he uses Ti to get the corresponding Ni recorded in his
database and decrypts ENi [vi] to get the plaintext vi. After extracting vi,
Charlie checks whether vi is correct. If it is correct, Charlie counts this vote.
After all the votes have been counted, Charlie publishes all the groups
(Ti, vi) for the eligible voter to check whether he/she has voted successfully.
The scheme is now completed.
2.2.3. Security analysis
In this election scheme, the voting administrator will check the identity
of each voter before accepting a voting request and will not respond to one
voter twice; Charlie will check whether he has received Ti before counting vi
so that the eligibility and unreusability criteria are satisfied. At the same
time, the earlier voters votes will have no effect on the later ones, and all the
eligible votes will be count correctly. Hence, the fairness and completeness
criteria are satisfied. Charlie will check each ballot before counting it, thus
guaranteeing the soundness of the process. At the end of the scheme, Charlie
will publish all the counted ballots for each voter to check whether he/she
has voted successfully; hence, the scheme satisfies the verifiability criterion.
The properties mentioned above are easy to prove; hence, now, we mainly
discuss the privacy of the scheme.
In this scheme, two independent parties collaborate to act as the voting
administrator, the function f(·) is information security, and the final key
string Ni and Ti between Vi and Charlie is invisible to others(the independent
parties Bob1 and Bob2 are included). As long as one of the two parties does
not cooperate with the other, the communication key stringsNi, Ti are secure.
However, the security of the protocol is difficult to achieve in real life because
there is no effective way to guarantee that the two parties Bob1 and Bob2
will not cooperate to trace the ballots forever. Whenever the two parties
cooperate, the privacy of the election is compromised.
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3. Distributed anonymous quantum key distribution
Considering the problem that mentioned in the case of the traditional
distributed election scheme, it is impossible to ensure that the two distributed
parties Bob1 and Bob2 will not cooperate forever. However, according to
common sense, in a real election, we can think that there exists an overseeing
body to monitor the elections; this institution will supervise both sides for a
certain period of time so as to ensure that they do not cooperate with one
another within this time period. On the basis of this viewpoint, we assume
that the administrator is made up of two parties Bob1 and Bob2, who cannot
collaborate to cheat during the scheme. When the scheme is complete, the
private of the voter will not be compromised even if Bob1 and Bob2 cooperate.
Anonymous quantum key distribution(AQKD) can be used for ensuring
the private of the voter in the case of a semi-honest model[27]. If one voter
can share a key string with Charlie anonymously, he/she can easily encrypts
his/her ballot anonymously. Once others cannot match the key string with
the voter, they also cannot trace the ballot. In view of the problems in the
earlier paper[27], we present an improved distributed AQKD protocol that
will be used in the new distributed quantum election scheme.
3.1. Qubit-based distributed AQKD protocol
Suppose a voter Vi wants to anonymously establish a key string with the
counter Charlie with the help of the voting administrator Bob(made up of
two independent parties Bob1 and Bob2). The voter wants to ensure that
nobody except himself/herself and Charlie can get the key string, which is
difficult to achieve through traditional key distribution, because there is no
reliable way to avoid others from copying the information. The quantum
non-cloning theorem guarantees that it is impossible to measure or copy an
unknown qubit without being detected. Based on this, we present a qubit-
based AQKD protocol:
Prerequisite: Bob1 has established a secret string Si1 = (Ni1‖Ti1) with Vi
and Charlie, and Bob2 has established a secret string Si2 = (Ni2‖Ti2) with Vi
and Charlie. Both Vi and Charlie compute Ni = f(Ni1, Ni2), Ti = f(Ti1, Ti2).
Step 1. Vi randomly chooses a string Ri ∈ {0, 1}m, and generates his
qubits |αi〉 by the method of conjugate coding[31]:
|αi〉 = HNi |Ri〉 = ⊗mj=1(HN
j
i |Rji 〉), (6)
9
where N ji and R
j
i denote the j-th bit of Ni,Ri, and H
Ni = ⊗mj=1HN
j
i , H0 =
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, H1 = H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
Then, Vi anonymously transmits the quantum state |αi〉 with the secret
string Ti to Charlie.
Step 2. Charlie checks whether he has received Ti before. If not, he uses
Ti to get the corresponding string Ni, and measures the quantum state |αi〉
depending on the value of Ni: if N
j
i = 0, he measures the qubit |αji 〉 with the
rectilinear basis {|0〉, |1〉}; otherwise he measures it with the diagonal basis
{|+〉, |−〉}. After obtaining the outcome, Charlie publishes a subset of the
outcome with Ti and all the location information of the bits of the subset;
we denote the subset by σi.
Step 3. Vi checks whether the subset σi is equal to the corresponding
subset of Ri. If it is, Vi knows that the quantum key distribution is successful.
Then, he/she deletes the checking bits σi and extracts the remaining bits of
Ri as the final encrypted key string
Ki = Ri − σi = KiL‖KiR, (7)
now Vi has anonymously established a key string Ki with Charlie.
Security analysis
In this protocol, we assume that Bob1 and Bob2 will not cooperate until
the protocol is complete, and the function f(·) is information security; thus,
neither Bob1 nor Bob2 can get the strings Ni or Ti during the AQKD protocol.
The quantum state |αi〉 is an unknown quantum state to others(Bob1, Bob2
included); hence, it is impossible to make a copy of the strings. A malicious
entity has to measure the initial qubits if he wants to get some useful informa-
tion about the final encryption key string. However, without the encoding
basis of the qubits, he will choose the wrong measuring basis with a 50%
probability for each qubit and then introduce no less than 25% error rate in
Charlie’s measuring outcome. This implies that without Ti it is impossible
to make a correct measurement on the quantum state |αi〉, and an incorrect
measurement will affect Charlie’s measuring outcome and be detected by Vi
in the last step of the anonymous key distribution phase; Vi will then stop the
scheme. As a result, nobody except Vi and Charlie can get the final encryp-
tion key string Ki. The probability that others except Vi and Charlie guess
the correct x-bit key string Ki is not more than (
1
2
)x. When x is sufficiently
large, the probability is negligible. In other words, when the anonymous key
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distribution phase is complete, there is no effective way for Bob1 and Bob2
to get the final encryption key string even if they cooperate to do so.
Practicability analysis
Considering the problem mentioned in the case of the traditional dis-
tributed election scheme, we just assume that the two independent entities
Bob1 and Bob2 will not cooperate for a limited period of time(just limited to
the end of the election). This is reasonable and easy to achieve in practice.
This AQKD protocol can also work even if there exist losses and errors
in the quantum channels. In order to establish an error-free key, Charlie
can publish all the qubits that he has received and then publish the check
string and its serial numbers in Step 2 of the anonymous key distribution
phase. If the error rate of the check string is acceptable, Vi can ensure that
the key distribution is successful. After verifying that the key distribution is
successful, Vi extracts the string Ki from Ri and subsequently uses Ki and
a key redistribution protocol[32] for establishing the final error-free key and
then uses the error-free key to encrypt his/her ballot[27].
3.2. Qubit-string-based distributed AQKD protocol
The former qubit-based distributed AQKD protocol can efficiently avoid
Bob from impersonating the voters to vote or tracing the ballots after the
election. The combination of anonymous quantum key distribution and the
distributed scheme guarantees the private of the voter. When the protocol
is completed, neither Bob1 nor Bob2 can get the final encrypted key string
even if they collaborate to do so. However, there is a further problem: in this
scheme Bob and Charlie should be two independent parties that will never
cooperate. Once the two parties cooperate the privacy of the voter is not
guaranteed. An ideal AQKD protocol should ensure that once the protocol is
completed nobody can compromise the private of the voter even if the voting
administrator and the counter cooperate to do so.
A qubit-string-based scheme can be used for solving this problem. The
improved AQKD protocol is as follows:
Prerequisite: Bob1 and Bob2 respectively establish specific key strings
with Vi, we denote the key strings by N
(1), L(1) and N (2), L(2); at the same
time, Bob1 and Bob2 respectively establish a specific key string with Charlie,
we denote the two strings by C(1) and C(2). Here,
C(1) = S(1)‖M (1)‖N (1)‖L(1), C(2) = S(2)‖M (2)‖N (2)‖L(2), (8)
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where
N (1), N (2) ∈ {0, 1}m,M (1),M (2) ∈ {0, 1}l, L(1), L(2) ∈ {0, 1}l, (9)
S(1) = (a11, · · · , a1m, · · · , al1, · · · , alm) ∈ {0, 1}lm, (10)
S(2) = (b11, · · · , b1m, · · · , bl1, · · · , blm) ∈ {0, 1}lm. (11)
The strings are the same for every voter.
Step 1. Bob1 and Bob2 respectively use the random number generator
to prepare a random string
R
(1)
i = (c11, · · · , c1m, · · · , cl1, · · · , clm) ∈ {0, 1}lm, (12)
R
(2)
i = (d11, · · · , d1m, · · · , dl1, · · · , dlm) ∈ {0, 1}lm, (13)
where
cj1 ⊕ cj2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cjm = M (1)j , 0 < j < l + 1, (14)
dj1 ⊕ dj2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ djm = M (2)j , 0 < j < l + 1, (15)
and collaborate to generate a quantum state |αi〉 by using conjugate coding:
|αi〉 = HS(2)Y R(2)HS(1)Y R(1)|0〉
= ⊗lj=1|αij〉
= ⊗lj=1 ⊗mk=1 HbjkY djkHajk |cjk〉.
(16)
Here |0〉 denotes an lm-dimensional zero vector, and H0 = I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
,
H1 = H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
,Y 0 = I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, Y 1 = Y =
(
0 −1
1 0
)
.
Then Bob sends the quantum state to Vi via a secure quantum channel.
In order to avoid the attacker from intercepting the qubits to extract infor-
mation, we can assume that both Bob1 and Bob2 use a secret key to flip the
qubits and the voter uses the keys to get the initial qubits.
Step 2. After receiving |αi〉, Vi randomly chooses a strings Ki ∈ {0, 1}l−m
and computes
N = f(N (1), N (2)), L = f(L(1), L(2)), Ti = EL[Ki‖N ], (17)
then, he randomly chooses a string Pi ∈ {0, 1}lm, where
Pi = (e1, e2, · · · , el) = (e11, · · · , e1m, · · · , el1, · · · , elm), (18)
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and
ej1 ⊕ ej2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ejm = (Ti)j, for 0 < j < l + 1. (19)
Step 3. Vi generates
|αi〉′ = Y Pi|αi〉 = ⊗lj=1 ⊗mk=1 Y ejk |αi〉jk. (20)
Then Vi sends |αi〉′′ to Charlie anonymously via a secure quantum channel.
Step 4. Charlie computes M = f(M (1),M (2)), N = f(N (1), N (2)), s =
f(S(1), S(2)) and L = f(L(1), L(2)) in advance. When he receives |αi〉′, Charlie
measures it depending on the value of the string s: if sj = 0, he measures
the qubit |αij〉′ with the rectilinear basis {|0〉, |1〉}, where j∈ {1, 2, · · · , lm}
throughout; otherwise he measures it with the diagonal basis {|+〉, |−〉}.
After getting the outcome r′, where
r′ = (h11, h12, · · · , h1m, · · · , hl1, · · · , hlm). (21)
Charlie computes M ′ = (M ′1,M
′
2, · · · ,M ′l ) with
M ′j = r
′
j1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r′jm, j = 1, 2, · · · , l (22)
and uses the string M to extract
T ′i = M ⊕M ′, (23)
then, he can obtain the strings K ′i‖N ′ by decrypting T ′i with the key L. Then
he checks whether N ′ is correct. If it is correct, Charlie ensures that he gets
the correct key string Ki.
After verifying all the key strings, Charlie will publicly publish a subset
of the string for the voter to verify whether the anonymous quantum key
distribution is successful; every voter publishes whether the quantum key
distribution is successful, and the voting administrator helps the failed ones
to restart a new anonymous quantum key distribution.
Security and practicability analysis
In this protocol we use m-qubits to transmit one key bit. Further, the
quantum state |αi〉′′ has been randomized by Vi, and hence, the voting ad-
ministrator and the counter cannot match the key string Ki with the voter
Vi even if they collaborate to do so.
When there exist losses and errors in the quantum channels, we can im-
prove the protocol as follows:
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In the voting phase, Vi uses the random number generator to generate a
random number
Pi = (e1, e2, · · · , el) = (e11, · · · , e1m, · · · , el1, · · · , elm), (24)
then he uses a classic error correction coding(ECC) to encode it and get the
corresponding code Di.
When he receives the qubits |αi〉 from Bob, Vi adds an operation as
follows:
|αi〉′ = ⊗jY Dij |αij〉. (25)
Vi adds Y
Di∗ to |αi∗〉 only if he receives this qubit. After doing so, Vi generates
the key string pi, where
pij = ej1 ⊕ ej2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ejm, j = 1, 2, · · · , l, (26)
then he sends |αi〉′ to Charlie along with the serial numbers of the qubits
that he receives from Bob. Charlie measures the qubits and extracts the
code D′i = Di⊕ e. He uses D′i to recover the string Pi and then generates the
key string pi. A dishonest voter or an attacker may also try to forge a ballot.
As he/she is not aware of the string S and M , he/she will introduce no less
than 75% error rate in the string D′i. While the error correction ability of
the ECC is not available to correct such a large error rate, it is impossible to
recover the string Pi.
4. Quantum distributed election schemes
A complete voting process in our quantum election scheme includes four
phases: initial phase, anonymous quantum key distribution phase, voting
phase and counting phase. Several voters Vj, j=1,2,· · · ,N, the voting admin-
istrator Bob(made up of two independent parties Bob1 and Bob2), and the
counter Charlie are also involved.
If Bob and Charlie are two independent parties that will not collaborate
forever, we can use both the qubit-based distributed AQKD protocol and the
qubit-string-based AQKD protocol that presented in Section 2; in order to
ensure that the private of the voter will not be threatened by the collaboration
of the voting administrator Bob and the counter Charlie forever, we use
the qubit-string-based AQKD protocol in our distributed quantum election
scheme.
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4.1. Initial phase
Bob1 and Bob2 respectively establish a specific key string with every el-
igible voter, we denote the key strings by N (1), L(1),N (2), L(2). At the same
time, Bob1 and Bob2 respectively establish a specific key string with Charlie,
we denote these two strings by C(1),C(2). Here
C(1) = S(1)‖M (1)‖N (1)‖L(1), C(2) = S(2)‖M (2)‖N (2)‖L(2), (27)
where N (1), N (2) ∈ {0, 1}m,M (1), L(1),M (2), L(2) ∈ {0, 1}l.
4.2. Anonymous key distribution phase
In this phase each eligible voter Vi anonymously establishes an encrypted
key string Ki = KiL‖KiR with the counter Charlie by using the qubit-string-
based AQKD protocol. The key string is used for encrypting the ballot and it
is invisible to the others(Bob1 and Bob2 included) except for Vi and Charlie.
After all the voters anonymously establish key strings with Charlie, the
scheme moves to the voting phase.
4.3. Voting and counting phase
(1) Vi chooses a candidate as his vote vi and encrypts it with KiR. Then,
he sends EKiR [vi] to Charlie along with KiL.
(2) After receiving (KiL, EKiR [vi]), Charlie checks whether he has received
EKiL before. If the check succeeds, Charlie uses KiL to extract the cor-
responding KiR. Then, he decrypts EKiR [vi] to get the ballot vi. If the
outcome vi is eligible, Charlie counts this vote.
After all the votes has been count, Charlie publishes all the groups (EKiL , vi)
for the eligible voter to check whether he/she has voted successfully.
The scheme is now completed.
4.4. Security and practicability analysis
Privacy: The quantum state |αi〉′ is randomized by Vi before it is sent
to Charlie. The initial quantum state |αi〉 is generated by both Bob1 and
Bob2. After Bob1’s operation, the qubits can be denoted as
|α(1)i 〉 = HS
(1)
Y R
(1)
i |0〉, (28)
15
then the qubits are transmitted to Bob2. As the strings S
(1), R
(1)
i are not
aware to Bob2, the density matrix of the qubits can be expanded as
ρ
(1)
i =
1
22lm
∑
S(1),R
(1)
i
HS
(1)
Y R
(1)
i σY R
(1)
i HS
(1)
, (29)
where σ denotes the density matrix of |0〉. Bob2 flips the quantum state
depending on the value of S(2), R
(2)
i , as S
(2), R
(2)
i are randomly distributed,
after Bob2’s operation, the density matrix of the qubits |αi〉 that transmitted
to Vi can be written as
ρi =
1
24lm
∑
S(1),S(2),R
(1)
i ,R
(2)
i
HS
(2)
Y R
(2)
i HS
(1)
Y R
(1)
i σY R
(1)
i HS
(1)
Y R
(2)
i HS
(2)
=
1
24lm
∑
S(1),S(2),R
(1)
i ,R
(2)
i
HS
(1)⊕S(2)Y R
(1)
i ⊕R(2)i σY R
(1)
i ⊕R(2)i HS
(1)⊕S(2)
=
1
22lm
∑
s,ri
HsY riσY riHs,
(30)
here s = f(S(1), S(2)), ri = f(R
(1)
i , R
(2)
i ). We can verify that the set of 2
2lm
unitary matrices {HsY ri} forms an orthonormal basis. In view of the quan-
tum one-time pad in [11, 12], in this basis the density matrix σ can be ex-
panded as
σ =
∑
η,ξ
aη,ξH
ηY ξ, (31)
where aη,ξ = Tr(σY
ξHη)/2lm. Now the density matrix ρ can be expanded as
ρi =
1
22lm
∑
s,ri
HsY ri
∑
η,ξ
aη,ξH
ηY ξY riHs
=
1
22lm
∑
η,ξ
aη,ξ
∑
s,ri
HsY riHηY ξY riHs
=
1
22lm
∑
η,ξ
aη,ξ
∑
s,ri
(−1)ri·η⊕s·ξHηY ξ
=
∑
η,ξ
aη,ξδη,0δξ,0H
ηY ξ
= a0,0I =
Tr(σ)
2lm
=
1
2lm
I.
(32)
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After receiving the quantum state, Vi adds quantum operation to it depend-
ing on the value of the strings Pi. We use ρ
′
i to denote the density matrix of
the randomized quantum state. As Pi is randomly distributed, after Vi’s op-
eration, for the attacker who cannot obtain the generation basis and values,
the density matrix of the qubits can be expanded as
ρ
′(0)
i =
1
22lm
∑
s,r(0)
HsY r
(0)
σY r
(0)
Hs =
1
2lm
I, (33)
where r
(0)
i = ri⊕Pi. This implies the information that determines the unitary
transformation Y after Vi’s operation. For Bob1 and Bob2, the density matrix
of the qubits can be respectively expanded as
ρ
′(1)
i =
1
22lm
∑
S(2),r(1)
HS
(2)
Y r
(1)
σY r
(1)
HS
(2)
=
1
2lm
I for Bob1, (34)
ρ
′(2)
i =
1
22lm
∑
S(1),r(2)
HS
(1)
Y r
(2)
σY r
(2)
HS
(1)
=
1
2lm
I for Bob2, (35)
where r(1) = r(0) ⊕R(1)i , and r(2) = r(0) ⊕R(2)i . The two density matrices are
in a completely mixed state. Hence, Bob1 and Bob2 cannot obtain any useful
information about V ′i s identity from the state. For the counter Charlie, the
density matrix can be expanded as
ρ
′(3)
i =
1
2l(m−1)
∑
r(3)
Y r
(3)
σY r
(3)
=
1
2l(m−1)
∑
r(3)
|r(3)〉〈r(3)| = 1
2l(m−1)
I, (36)
where r(3) = r(0)⊕R(1)i ⊕R(2)i =(r(3)11 , · · · , r(3)1m, · · · , r(3)l1 , · · · , r(3)lm ) and satisfies
the condition that
r
(3)
j1 ⊕ r(3)j2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r(3)jm = Mj ⊕ (Ti)j, for 0 < j < l + 1. (37)
We can see that the density matrix of the final quantum state |αi〉′ that
Vi sends to Charlie is a totally mixed state. Hence, the attacker(Charlie
and Bob1, Bob2 included) cannot extract any useful information about Vi’s
identity IDi even if he intercepts the entire state. At the same time, his
attack will change the initial qubits and then be discovered by the honest
parties. Although this discovery is not verifiable and the honest parties
cannot point out the specific attacker, the attacker cannot compromise the
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private of a voter. Further, Charlie’s measurement outcome is randomized
and will not reveal any information of the voter’s identity, Charlie cannot
match the ballot vi with the voter Vi even if he collaborates with Bob1 and
Bob2, hence, the voters’ private is guaranteed.
Unreusability and soundness: In the case of any two voters Vi and Vj,
Bob respectively sends a quantum state |αi〉 and |αj〉 to them. The density
matrix of these two quantum states can be expressed as
ρj =
1
22lm
∑
s,ri
HsY riσY riHs =
1
2lm
I, (38)
ρj =
1
22lm
∑
s,rj
HsY rjσY rjHs =
1
2lm
I, (39)
both the states are totally mixed state. Hence, the voters cannot distinguish
between |αi〉 and |αj〉. Thus the voters cannot obtain any information about
the preparation basis and values R
(1)
i ,R
(2)
i ,S
(1) and S(2) of the quantum states
that generated by Bob.
According to the quantum no-cloning theorem it is impossible to copy
an unknown quantum state without the preparation basis of the state. If an
attacker wants to forge a valid ballot, he has to prepare a quantum state and
send it to Charlie. As the quantum state is randomly prepared, Charlie will
get the correct value of each bit of N ′ with the probability 50%. Thus, the
probability that a forged quantum state passes Charlie’s identity check is not
more than (1
2
)x, while x is large enough, the probability is close to 0. Hence,
an attacker has to obtain the information of the state preparation basis, that
is, he has to obtain the value of the string s.
Suppose several voters collaborate to guess the string s. For example, we
consider the first m bits of s. Suppose n voters collaborate to guess these
m bits. A subset(e.g., the number is m) of the voter guess a random m-bit
string and use it to measure the first m-qubit of their quantum state that
received from Bob. After obtaining the outcome every voter computes the
XOR of all the m bits of his/her outcome. If all the m voters obtain the same
value, they believe that the string that they choose is correct; otherwise, they
think that the string is wrong. The probability that the m voters obtain the
same XOR value is
P1 =
1
2m−1
, (40)
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hence, they can exclude a wrong string with the probability
P2 = 1− P1 = 1− 1
2m−1
. (41)
When m is sufficiently large, the probability is close to 1. After excluding an
invalid string, another set of m voters can exclude another wrong string with
probability P2 in the same manner. In order to find the correct s, the voters
have to exclude all the wrong strings. This requires at least (2m−1)∗m voters
to collaborate. When the number of the voters is considerably less than this
number, it is impossible to obtain the correct generation basis even if all the
voters collaborate up to find it. Without the basis the voters cannot forge
quantum states to execute malicious anonymous quantum key distribution
for cheating. Therefore, it is impossible for the voters to disturb an election
by forging valid ballot to vote more than twice; their forged ballots will be
discovered and discarded by Charlie. Hence, Soundness and unreusability
are guaranteed.
Eligibility: Charlie will check the identity of the voter before counting
his ballot; therefore, only eligible voters will be permitted to vote. At the
same time, without the quantum state generated by the voting administrator,
it is impossible for an attacker to forge a valid ballot; his invalid ballot will
be discovered and discarded by Charlie, and hence, eligibility is guaranteed.
Verifiability and fairness: In this scheme, Charlie will publish the
result of the election, so that every voter can check his/her ballot at the
end of the scheme; the earlier voters have no effect on the later voters, and
the scheme is fair to all the voters. Hence, verifiability and fairness are
guaranteed.
Completeness: As the voting administrator and the counter are mon-
itored during the election, and any dishonest attempt by the two will be
detected. Further, if Charlie attempts to tamper with the statistics of the
ballots, he will be detected by the voters. Hence completeness is guaranteed.
As the qubit-string-based AQKD protocol can resist the losses and errors
of the quantum channels, the distributed quantum election scheme works well
even when the quantum channels have losses and errors. The only request
in this scheme is the existence of the overseeing body that monitors the par-
ticipants of the election during the protocol; under such a body, neither the
voting administrator nor the counter can cheat during the election, thereby
ensuring the security of the scheme.
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5. Discussion
Considering the problem mentioned in the previous papers, we present
a new type of unconditionally secure distributed election scheme, in which
the voting administrator is made up of independent entities that cannot
cooperate to cheat during an election. The security of the distributed election
scheme is based on the security of the distributed anonymous quantum key
distribution protocol, which depends on the quantum key distribution to
ensure unconditional security. Once a voter anonymously establishes a key
string with the counter, nobody can match him/her with his/her ballot as
the ballot is encrypted by the key string and it is impossible to trace the key
string in the anonymous quantum key distribution scheme. This distribution
scheme is used for removing the threat posed by the collaboration of the
voting administrator and the counter.
Compared with the traditional distributed election scheme mentioned in
Section 2, the proposed scheme can not only efficiently solve a dispute be-
tween a voter and the administrator but also solve the difficulty of moni-
toring the independent parties forever. In the new scheme, we just assume
that there exists an overseeing body to monitor the two entities during the
election, thereby guaranteeing the security and the privacy of the election.
When the scheme is completed, nobody can match the key string and the
corresponding voter even if the administrator and the voter collaborate to
do so; hence, it is impossible to track the ballot. In the qubit-sting-based
anonymous quantum key distribution scheme, we use an optical encryption
method to randomize the initial quantum state and conceal the voter’s iden-
tity information. After Vi’s operation nobody(Bob and Charlie included)
can obtain any information of Vi. Although this anonymous quantum key
distribution consumes a considerable number of key bits pre-shared between
the parties, it can efficiently solve the problem that is not solved in the tra-
ditional distributed election scheme, and avoid the voting administrator and
the counter from matching a voter with his ballot after the election even if
they collaborate.
In view of the problems mentioned in the existing quantum election
schemes[21−26], the proposed distributed quantum election scheme uses qubit-
string-based anonymous quantum key distribution to ensure unconditional
security and privacy. It ensures the completeness, soundness, privacy, eligi-
bility, unreusability, fairness, and verifiability of the election, and removes the
threat posed by the collaboration up of the administrator and the counter.
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Nobody can trace the ballot to destroy the privacy of the voters, and the
voters can at the same time check whether they have voted successfully or
not. Further, the proposed distributed quantum election scheme is relatively
easy to implement because we have not used a quantum entanglement state
and the scheme does not require any complicated quantum measurement.
Considering the definition of covert security discussed in [28], we can state
that a protocol with covert security can guarantee that an honest party will
notice the cheating attempt of the adversary with constant probability. In
the proposed distributed quantum election scheme, the security of the vot-
ing depends on the security of the quantum key distribution; as the voting
administrator is made up of some entities that will not cooperate to cheat
during the voting, a cheating attempt to forge ballots by any member of the
voting administrator will be discovered by the counter in the counting phase.
At the same time, a dishonest attempt of the counter to tamper with the
statistics will be discovered or detected in the final counting phase. There-
fore, neither the voting administrator nor the counter can cheat successfully
without being discovered. Further, an attackers attempt to forge a valid
ballot will be discovered by Charlie with the probability 1− (1
2
)x; if x is suf-
ficiently large, the probability is close to 1. Therefore, the scheme in a sense
satisfies the requirement of the security and the privacy of the information.
A more secure scheme which ensures covert security with public verifi-
cation requires that the honest parties can not only discover the existence
of cheat but also determine the dishonest parties or attackers. Anonymous
quantum communication[33,34] designed for the anonymous transmission of a
quantum state against an active adversary with information-theoretical se-
curity may probably be helpful to achieve this propose. Though our scheme
is constructed without the use of entangle states to guarantee the practical-
ity of the quantum election, we would like to try employing the anonymous
quantum communication to construct new quantum election schemes with
public verification security.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a combination of a distributed scheme and quantum
cryptography to construct an unconditionally secure distributed anonymous
quantum key distributed scheme, based on which we developed a new type of
unconditionally secure election scheme. In the anonymous quantum key dis-
tribution, we used the optimal encryption of quantum bits to help a voter to
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anonymously establish a key string with the counter and efficiently removed
the threat posed by the voting administrator and the counter. In the pro-
posed distributed quantum election scheme, after the election, nobody could
trace the ballot to compromise the privacy of the voter even if the voting
administrator and the counter collaborated to do so. The new distributed
quantum election scheme satisfies the completeness, soundness, privacy, eli-
gibility, unreusability, fairness, and verifiability requirements of an election.
As long as the two parties that made up the administrator did not cooperate
to cheat during the election, the privacy of the election was not compromised
by the administrator and the counter after the election even if they collabo-
rated to do so. The distributed quantum election scheme also worked when
the quantum channels contained losses and errors.
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